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HENRY VAUX, JR.*

Equity in Policy: Failure and
Opportunity
ABSTRACT
The preoccupation of economists with matters of efficiency helps to
explain why matters of economic equity have been neglected. Further, the fact that desirable patterns of equity cannot be identified
scientifically constrains economists from making normative judgments about equity. The fact that policymakers are frequently disinterested in equity matters means that economists tend to look
elsewhere within their field for interesting questions to pursue. Two
case study examples illustrate how the resolution of equity issues can
be joined with solutions to other water management problems. The
first case study, Northern Voices, focuses on the making of land
and water policy in an area at considerable risk from the development of the Alberta, or Athabasca, tar sands and other upstream
mining. Policy options which acknowledge, rather than ignore, the
preferences of First Nations aboriginal peoples of the Northwest Territories would protect environmental assets which provide significant environmental services for all residents of the Western
Hemisphere. The second case study concerns the Colorado River, and
exemplifies the problems of over-allocated river basins. Recent experience shows that conventional negotiating processes are unlikely to
lead to reductions in water allocations. The significant claims of Native Americans to the waters of the Colorado could be settled and
over-allocation managed by awarding basin tribes rights to much of
the Colorado River and authorizing them to auction water to the
highest bidder through a Colorado River Water Exchange.

I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, considerations of equity or fairness have played
little or no role in the making of federal natural resource policy. This
neglect of equity is particularly glaring in the making of recent federal
water policy history, where the principal trend has been one of devolving policy responsibility—but not financial resources—to the respective
states. Natural resource policy, and water policy more specifically, mirror these trends in federal policymaking that date back nearly 30 years.
Beginning around 1980, the United States experienced a growing disparity between the socioeconomic positions of the well off and the poor.
Although this trend was attenuated to some extent in the 1990s, it accel* Henry Vaux, Jr., is Professor Emeritus of Resource Economics at the University of
California, Berkeley, and the University of California, Riverside.
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erated significantly immediately upon the turn of the century. It remains
to be seen whether future efforts to reduce this disparity can work in the
current political landscape.
As a simple empirical matter, continuation of trends which produce a widening gap between the rich and poor should be a cause for
concern. Historical evidence suggests that societies that ignore such gaps
are not sustainable. More specifically, the relegation of more and more
people into categories of poverty and near poverty, while the few welloff become increasingly more prosperous, raises serious issues about the
validity of the social contract between government and the governed.
The issue of economic equity or fairness is not one that can be ignored
with impunity.1
In the modern era, taxation and social welfare policies have been
the means most used for addressing inequities in the distribution of economic assets. But, simultaneously all manner of spending programs and
various subsidies have also affected the distribution of economic assets.
Some of these subsidies, such as land grants to railroads, have solely
favored corporations, while others have favored both individuals and
corporations. Such was the case with the early participants of the federal
reclamation program, whose interest payments were forgiven on capital
investments needed to impound and deliver water to their farms. Other
programs have favored the rich and are frequently tagged as “welfare for
the rich.”2
The distributional effects of tax and welfare policies are reasonably well known and broadly publicized. This is generally not the case
with spending programs where the incidence or distributions of benefits
are often masked or hidden, making it difficult to sort them by personal
income or wealth categories. Although there are probably a few exceptions, most federal natural resource policies have not been distributionally neutral, favoring businesses, corporations, or individuals in the
upper half of the income and/or wealth spectrum. The poor, minorities,
and indigenous people have rarely been the beneficiaries of such
policies.
This general discussion raises two broad questions: First, why is it
that the distributional impacts of alternative spending and programmatic
policies are rarely analyzed and debated? Although a full explanation
has several factors, a partial explanation lies with the fact that professional economists have rarely focused upon the incidence of costs and

1. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL, GLOBAL TRENDS 2025: A TRANSFORMED WORLD
(2008); TONY JUDT, ILL FARES THE LAND (2010).
2. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LIBERAL (2007).
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benefits of alternative resource policies ex ante. In turn, this fact has multiple explanations.
Second, if there is in fact a will to redress obvious examples of
inequity or unfairness, could such redress be a joint outcome of policies
designed to address other important problems along with the management of water resources? Two case studies, one focused on the Mackenzie River Basin of northern Canada and another focused on the Colorado
River Basin of the southwestern United States, suggest that there are ample opportunities to devise solutions to modern problems of resource
management while at the same time enhancing the welfare and the quality of life of indigenous peoples. The remainder of this article addresses
these questions, first, by considering why so little work has been done on
the economic equity implications of policy alternatives ex ante, and second, by presenting two relatively straightforward cases in which equity
objectives could be achieved jointly with other important objectives of
water policy. These cases illustrate instances in which equity considerations can be addressed simultaneously with allocative issues and issues
of water quality.
II. THE ECONOMICS OF EQUITY
There are several disciplines that deal directly with issues of fairness or equity. Important contributions to issues of fairness have come
from philosophy, political science, law, and even geography.3 Within this
mix, the economics discipline offers at least one distinct advantage and
one distinct disadvantage. The advantage is that economics is a solid and
long-standing empirical tradition. Within this tradition economists have
developed relatively simple and straightforward methods for describing
the distribution of income and or/wealth. The disadvantage, however,
lies with the fact that economists view questions of fairness or equity as
value judgments. Thus, one of the main tenets of the discipline is that
normative issues—issues related to the desirable or optimal patterns of
fairness—cannot be resolved scientifically. Economists then have no special insights or training that permits them to make normative statements
about fairness. This narrows the playing field considerably, as virtually
all other areas of economics are open to normative and prescriptive
research.

3. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); John G. Tisdell, Equity and Social Justice in
Water Doctrines, 16 SOC. JUST. RES. 401, 416 (2003); EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989); Wicky Meynen & Martin Doornbos, Decentralizing Natural Resource
Management: A Recipe for Sustainability and Equity, 16 EUR. J. DEV. RES. 235 (2004).
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The structure of economics creates prejudices and disincentives,
which result in the lack of attention to, or outright neglect of, the distributional effects of alternative policies. The fact that the economics of
wealth or income distribution is limited only to measuring and describing alternative states of economic equity makes such endeavors relatively unattractive compared with other areas. Moreover, compelling
issues in public economics thus tend to crowd out interest in describing
the distributional consequences of alternative public policy. Nevertheless, the discipline has already developed convenient, shorthand methods of describing the distribution of income or wealth. The failure to
employ such methods more frequently in public policy discourse, however, is a shortcoming that could be easily rectified.
A. Positive and Normative Economics
There are a number of important distinctions within the discipline
of economics. One is the distinction between positive and normative economics. Simply stated, positive economics is concerned with the description, specification, and measurement of historical, current, or future
economic conditions. It focuses on actual or hypothetical circumstances
and on their causes and impacts. Normative economics, on the other
hand, focuses on the description, specification, and measurement of economic circumstances as they should be. In other words, normative economics focuses on the achievement of economic optima which can be
expressed in a variety of ways.
Normative goals and objectives for the economy are frequently
expressed in terms of efficiency. Efficiency has a number of meanings
but is commonly understood to characterize either circumstances where
product and/or value is maximized from some fixed set of resources, or
where the allocation of inputs and outputs maximizes the economic return, which is subject to appropriate adjustment for external costs and
benefits for the existence of public goods.4 In macroeconomics, normative objectives typically focus on several factors, such as: reducing levels
of unemployment, keeping inflation and deflation in check, assuring appropriate levels of aggregate investment, and optimizing the growth and
level of gross domestic product. Normative studies are typically prescriptive and are based on the desirability of achieving widely agreed
upon economic goals (at least among economists).5

4. RICHARD W. TRESH, PUBLIC FINANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 549 (2d ed. 2002).
5. Id.
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Economic equity is typically defined in terms of the fairness of the
distribution of economic assets such as income, wealth, and capital.6 As
noted above, economists have no special qualifications that allow them
to describe what optimal or desirable pattern of economic equity would
look like. That is a value judgment that ought properly be left to those
who broker values in society. This lesson is drummed into the heads of
graduate students in economics at virtually every opportunity.
The consequence of this lack of specialized qualifications is that
economists interested in equity and distributional issues face a domain
that is constrained to the measurement, description, and forecasting of
historical, existing, or future states of distribution. This alone might be
sufficient to encourage many economists to work in different subfields
where the opportunities to develop credible policy prescriptions are
much greater. There is one important qualification, however. The distributional consequences of tax policy have long been of interest to economists because the economics of taxation is partly a matter of incidence.7
Interest in such issues is strong because there is general agreement
within society that taxes should be fair. The fact that there is no agreed
upon definition of the concept of “fair” means that the distributional consequences of taxation vary widely. Some are progressive, falling disproportionately on the rich or wealthy, and some are regressive, falling
disproportionately upon the poor.
Another frequently discussed objective of taxation is the issue of
allocative neutrality, meaning, all other things equal, that taxes should be
designed in such a fashion as to leave relative prices unaffected so that
the allocation of goods and services, and the resources needed to produce them, remains unaffected by the presence of taxes. However, interest in the allocative consequences of taxes at the policymaking level
appears to be minimal, much like the interest in distributional consequences. In recent years, the goals of tax policy have been heavily influenced by monied interests bent on reducing their own burdens.8
Although it is generally conceded that recent taxation policies have
worked to the benefit of the wealthy (which in itself seems inconsistent
with the American sense of fairness) there is little or no interest on the
part of policymakers in addressing these issues in the short term.
The lack of interest on the part of policymakers in the distributional consequences of substantive, programmatic, and spending policies
acts as a strong disincentive for economists to focus on such consequences. Moreover, the distributional consequences of alternative sets of
6. Id.
7. BERNARD SALANIE, THE ECONOMICS
8. KRUGMAN, supra note 2.

OF

TAXATION 848 (2003).
R
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policies affecting millions of citizens may be difficult to work out ex ante.
Furthermore, the introduction of distributional goals into natural resource policymaking creates another set of difficult value judgments. For
example, to what extent should principles of good management and husbandry be traded off to advance distributional considerations about
which there may not even be general agreement?
Welfare policies aside, it can be inferred from most national authorizing and appropriations legislation that the distributional consequences of spending and programmatic policies should remain obscure.
In some instances this obscurity may be due to the outrageousness of the
associated distributional consequences, making them impossible to sustain if widely known. In actuality, very few policies that are focused on
the management of natural resources in general (water in particular),
have distributional consequences that are well understood. For example,
it seems highly unlikely that the people in the lower quartile of the income distribution spectrum were the principal beneficiaries of the large
subsidies associated with the administration of the Reclamation Act of
1902 as amended.9
B. Public Economics
In the last decades of the twentieth century the field of public economics expanded from a focus on taxation to consideration of all appropriate programs of public spending and programmatic policies. The
“new” public economics included detailed consideration of justifications
for public interventions in free market activities, as well as detailed characterizations of pure public goods, open access resources, and common
property resources.10
This latter focus had important implications for resource and environmental economics both conceptually, and in specifying appropriate
management strategies and interventions. At the conceptual level, the
work of Baumol and Oates, and that of Ostrom, was critical in classifying
and clarifying the characteristics of various resources that were not optimally exploited and allocated under free markets. Ultimately, many of
the concepts developed by these authors form the basis for substantial
literature on groundwater, on grazing lands, on genetic resources, on

9. Reclamation Act of 1902, ch. 1093, 32 Stat. 388 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C.
§ 391 (2006)).
10. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (3d ed. 2000).
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many assets which provide environmental services, and on issues of the
global commons such as global warming.11
The volume, magnitude, and efficacy of this work would seem to
have made it far more attractive and significant than work on the distributional issues of natural resource and environmental policy. Indeed, the
sheer volume of work on the economics of natural resource exploitation
and management, the oversight of open access and common property
resources, and the valuation of non-marketed assets suggest that the interests of economists in equity and distributional issues were crowded
out by the many other opportunities available in the subfield of resource
and environmental economics.
C. Measuring Distributional Impacts
For all of the disincentives and constraints that confront the economist interested in working on distributional and equity issues, there is a
common method for measuring those impacts at hand. This method is
both graphical and mathematical and allows for the general distributional consequences of any set of policies to be summarized at a glance
by examining either or both. The concepts in question are the Lorenz
Curve and the Gini Coefficient. Both take equal distribution of income or
wealth as the point of reference. It is understood that this is the point of
reference and not necessarily the desired objective, which ultimately remains a value judgment for determination by policymakers.12
As shown in Figure 1 (below), the Lorenz Curve is a simple plot
with the percent of cumulative income earned (or wealth) on the vertical
axis and the percent of families or individuals on the horizontal axis. The
diagonal line represents the locus of points depicting an equal absolute
distribution. That is, the point where 20 percent of the families have 20
percent of the wealth, and 80 percent of the families have 80 percent of
the wealth, and so forth. The Lorenz Curve is the line which depicts the
actual distribution of wealth. As shown, it summarizes a distribution of
wealth that is skewed away from poorer families and towards more
wealthy families.
The Gini Coefficient is a simple mathematical measure of the extent and direction of inequality. In Figure 1, the Gini Coefficient is equal
to (area A) divided by (area A + area B). The closer the value of the
coefficient is to one, the more income (or wealth) is distributed with ab11. WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, THE THEORY OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY
(2d ed. 1988); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS
FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (1990).
12. Brian Slack & Jean-Paul Rodrigue, The Gini Coefficient: Definition, http://people.
hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch4en/meth4en/ch4m1en.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
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Figure 1: The Lorenz Curve

Figure prepared by Linda Petras.

solute equality. It should be recognized that obtaining the data necessary
to produce Lorenz Curves and Gini Coefficients may not be a trivial task.
In some circumstances, the acquisition of data ex ante may be a significant constraint on efforts to make systematic assessments of policy options. Nevertheless, the Lorenz Curve and the Gini Coefficient provide a
convenient shorthand for understanding the distributional implications
of alternative policies where the will and resources are present to support the acquisition of the necessary data.
III. EQUITY AND JOINTNESS IN POLICY: TWO CASE STUDIES
One of the conclusions flowing from the economics of equity is
that it will always be cheaper and more efficient to tackle distributional
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issues directly.13 This implies that taxes and direct subsidies (not subsidies in-kind) would be the preferred means of altering the distribution of
income, for example. This prescription stands in contrast with prevailing
practices which tend to obscure the incidence of costs and benefits from
subsidies as well as program and spending policies. For example, the
true cost of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation program, which provided
irrigation water to western farmers, was masked because the magnitude
of the subsidy inherent in free interest on the capital needed to build the
facilities was rarely acknowledged.
Nevertheless, it has been rare historically, and would be unusual
now, to enact natural resource or water resource policies for the exclusive purpose of altering income or wealth distribution in favor of some
preferred income or wealth distribution. It follows then that efforts to
adjust or “improve” distributional patterns of wealth or income through
resource policy would most frequently be joint in nature. Stated more
specifically, there is almost always more than a single strategic policy
which can achieve some desired outcome. The distributional consequences of alternative policies may differ significantly or not at all. Consequently, it is important to recognize that natural resource or water
policies achieve distributional consequences jointly with the objective
they are primarily designed to pursue.
Two case studies illustrate how joint policies can affect equity by
enhancing the welfare of indigenous peoples historically treated unfairly. The first case, selected from northern Canada, shows how the protection of environmental assets conferring environmental services on the
entire Western Hemisphere can protect those services while also enhancing the welfare of aboriginal peoples who inhabit the Northwest Territories. The second case, which is in the form of a proposal, provides an
example of a mechanism that addresses the over-allocation of water from
a given river basin while also enhancing the income and wealth of a
group of Native American tribes. Both studies illustrate how problems of
over-allocation and reallocation can be solved in ways that enhance the
income and wealth positions of indigenous groups that have not always
been the beneficiaries of water resources policies.

13. TRESH, supra note 4.

R
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A. CASE STUDY I: Northern Voices—Protecting Environmental
Assets
The Northwest Territories of Canada occupy an area of 1.2 million
square kilometers—about 12 percent of the total area of Canada.14 It is a
sparsely populated land of rivers, lakes, and muskeg. Population totals a
little over 43,000, of whom slightly more than half are aboriginal, or First
Nations citizens, as they are known in Canada.15 As shown in Figure 2
(below), the Northwest Territories lie within the Mackenzie River Basin.
The Mackenzie is the largest north flowing river in the Western Hemisphere. Average annual discharge of the Mackenzie is 10,300 m3/second,
which makes it the second largest river in North America and the twentieth largest in the world in terms of discharge. The principal tributaries
are the Athabasca and Peace rivers which originate in Alberta and British
Columbia respectively, and conjoin to make the Slave River which flows
into Great Slave Lake, the sixth largest freshwater lake in the world. The
Mackenzie River itself flows out of Great Slave Lake and northward to
the Arctic Ocean.16
The waters and associated aquatic and terrestrial habitats of the
Northwest Territories support an array of environmental assets which
include habitat for migratory birds and waterfowl, fisheries, and landbased wildlife. The role of the Mackenzie’s freshwater discharge in the
behavior of the sea-ice-freshwater interface is as yet incompletely understood, but there is at least the possibility that destabilization of existing
equilibria through alteration of the quantity and quality of flows could
exacerbate the looming problems of climate change. In addition, the cultural and spiritual values of the waters of the Northwest Territories are
very important to the aboriginal people. Aboriginal rights and Canadian
federal law make clear that waters must remain substantially unaltered
with respect to protection of the health of aquatic and related terrestrial
ecosystems. The aboriginal peoples wish to preserve the option of living
off the land which entails hunting, fishing, and trapping. This option
cannot be preserved if there is significant destruction of habitat.17
As noted earlier, the environmental assets of the Northwest Territories confer real benefits as well as option value not just on the citizens

14. Government of the Northwest Territories, NWT Statistics, http://www.gov.nt.ca/
research/facts/index.html (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
15. Id.
16. GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, NORTHERN VOICES, NORTHERN WATERS: THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES WATER STEWARDSHIP STRATEGY DRAFT 6 (2009).
17. ROSENBERG INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON WATER POLICY, REPORT OF THE ROSENBERG
INTERNATIONAL FORUM ON WATER POLICY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES 7 (2009).
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Figure 2: The Mackenzie River Basin

This figure was originally created for a paper prepared by Rob C. de Loë, Professor and
University Research Chair in Water Policy and Governance, University of Waterloo,
Transboundary Water Governance in the Mackenzie River Basin, Canada, for the 7th Biennial
Rosenberg International Forum on Water Policy (Nov. 15–17, 2010). Reproduced with
permission of the author.

of the Northwest Territories but also on the citizens of Canada, all of
North America and, to a lesser extent, the Western Hemisphere. These
benefits have many of the properties of a pure public good. They are not
exclusive in consumption and are widespread. Thus, there is a clear case
for collective action and public oversight in the protective management
of these environmental assets. In this way, the interests of the aboriginal
peoples of the Northwest Territories align with the interests of millions
of other North Americans (and Central and South Americans as well).
There are major questions surrounding the protection and sustainability
of the environmental assets which produce these benefits. These questions focus on the growing industrial uses of water for mining, hydroe-
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lectric, and nuclear power development, and the escalation of the
development of the Alberta, or Athabasca, tar sands in the tributary watersheds upstream from the Northwest Territories.
Although phosphate mining in Saskatchewan and the development of additional electrical generating capacity—both hydro and nuclear—in British Columbia pose significant threats to the ecosystems of
the Mackenzie Basin, the largest threat today is the escalating development of the Alberta tar sands. In brief, the exploitation of the tar sands
entails massive excavation of hydrocarbon bearing material from the
ground; thermal separation (cooking) of the hydrocarbon material from
the remaining material; and the upgrading of the hydrocarbons to a form
from which they can be refined to conventional hydrocarbon products
such as gasoline and oil.18 The process is expensive and requires vast
amounts of land and water. In recent years, the sheer scale of the total
operation has grown as demand for hydrocarbon products continues to
skyrocket and supplies from conventional sources become tighter.
The main environmental threats from the tar sands include the
high probability of a dike failure in the tailing ponds, widespread and
total destruction of the environmental attributes in the immediate area of
the tar sands—an area that is expanding rapidly and could grow almost
unimaginably in the future—and the diminution of water flows in the
Athabasca River to support the extraction and refining processes of tar
sands. The area occupied by tar sands tailing ponds has grown from several hundred hectares in 1970 to nearly 14,000 hectares today. One or
more dike failures at the tailing ponds could have extremely adverse effects on the quality of the Athabasca River. The distinguished Canadian
limnologist, David Schindler, has stated that a breach in any of the dikes
and subsequent spillage of toxic residue into the Athabasca River would
cause the world to forget about the Exxon Valdez disaster.19
The need to clear cut forests, drain wetlands and fens, and scrape
off the soil used to construct dikes has destroyed thousands of hectares
of forested land which, because of its northerly location, will not easily
self-repair—even under more modest climatological circumstances. Additionally, the enormous amount of water used by tar sands processing,
which, by one estimate requires three barrels of water for each barrel of
non-upgraded hydrocarbon, threatens the flow regimes of the Athabasca

18. ANDREW NIKIFORUK, TAR SANDS: DIRTY OIL AND THE FUTURE OF A CONTINENT (2008);
Dr. David Schindler & Dr. Vic Adamowicz, Presentation at Running Out of Steam? A
Workshop on Oil Sands Development and Water Use in the Athabasca River Watershed:
Science and Market-Based Solutions (May 10, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.
powi.ca/pdfs/running_out_of_steam_final.pdf).
19. Id.
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River. Tar sands operations alone account for reductions in river flows
that total 9 percent. There is further concern because dry season flows
have declined by 30 percent since 1970 and are projected to decline 50
percent by 2050.20 These declines, which are apparently attributable to
global climate change, coupled with continued expansion of the tar
sands, would clearly exacerbate flow declines to levels substantially below those experienced in the past.21
While the tar sands represent the principal threat to the environmental integrity of the Northwest Territories, there are other prospective
developments that could pose major threats. The proposed construction
of a natural gas line and the development of oil and gas in the Western
Canadian Sedimentary Basin within the Mackenzie Basin could materially change the environmental face of all but the upper reaches of the
Mackenzie watershed. In addition, there are numerous ore deposits in
the basin which are likely to be mined as the global appetite for raw
materials continues to grow.
First Nations citizens and other downstream residents believe that
the quantity and quality of their waters is significantly impaired at today’s levels of development. They are fearful that projected future levels
of development would rob them of the resources upon which they have
depended historically and, in turn, rob them of the cultural and spiritual
values they derive from those resources. Even if such intangible values
are ignored, a preliminary valuation study indicates that the value of
land devoted to oil, gas, mineral, or timber production in the Mackenzie
Basin would contribute approximately $245/hectare (where 1 hectare =
2.47 acres) to gross domestic product as compared with a value of
$2790/hectare for environmental services.22 The citizens of the Northwest Territories have responded by advancing a carefully designed,
highly consultative process to develop a water resource management
strategy for the Northwest Territories.23 Although, not yet complete, the
draft strategy enunciates some 14 principles including fairness and equity. It also identifies four sets of primary needs which are: (1) human
sustenance; (2) ecosystem support; (3) support of traditional cultural
needs; and (4) economic needs. There are a number of important issues
that are identified for early resolution. They are:
• The lack of monitoring and the need for better data.
20. Id. at 143.
21. See id.
22. MARK ANIELSKI & SARA WILSON, THE REAL WEALTH OF THE MACKENZIE REGION:
ASSESSING THE NATURAL CAPITAL VALUES OF A NORTHERN BOREAL ECOSYSTEM (2009).
23. GOVERNMENT OF THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES, NORTHERN VOICES, NORTHERN WATERS, TOWARDS A WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENT STRATEGY FOR THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIES (2008).
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• Conflicting and ambiguous water rights and the need to establish complete clarity of water rights, including aboriginal
rights.
• The need for planning that acknowledges the importance of
both terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems and the interactions
between both.
• The need to acknowledge and adapt to climate change.
• The need to identify and screen emerging issues.
The strategy, which was to be finalized on May 20, 2010, not only
acknowledges the special needs of aboriginal peoples for protection of
land and water resources, but also demonstrates that the citizens of the
Territories are prepared to be effective stewards of the environmental
resources for themselves, the citizens of Canada, and other residents of
the North America and the Western Hemisphere. However, the strategy
and related documents underscore the problems—both current and potential—posed by existing management practices in upstream jurisdictions: Alberta, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan. Industrial water use
upstream for mining and energy development is beyond territorial control but has significant influence on the quantitative and qualitative
properties of the waters delivered to the Territories. Upstream industrial
water use and the strategies used to manage it will have a major effect on
the ability of the citizens of the Northwest Territories to manage their
own resources.24
The problem is complicated further by the Canadian national government which, in other circumstances, might be expected to adopt a
stronger position in the management of interterritorial/interprovincial
matters. The national government is perceived by some as an unwanted
intruder into both regional and local affairs, and by others as timid and
largely ineffectual in dealing with interprovincial matters. The citizens of
the Northwest Territories perceive the national government with some
ambivalence because not only has it failed to enforce existing laws and
treaties which would protect the Mackenzie and its tributaries, but also
continues to devolve responsibility for the management of natural resources to the provinces. This means that the accustomed problems of
interjurisdictional water management—such as between provinces and
territories—fail to get needed attention and effective oversight from the
national government.25
For example, a recent report from an independent review panel
concludes that there is ample legislative and treaty protection for both

24. Id. at 15.
25. ROSENBERG INTERNATIONAL FORUM
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the Northwest Territories and its aboriginal residents.26 The panel identifies no less than seven pieces of existing national legislation that protect
the quantity and quality of national waters, fisheries, and the environment at large. In addition, there is one treaty, Treaty 8, which protects
the rights to land and water resources of at least one group of aboriginal
peoples in the Northwest Territories.27 The review panel expressed surprise that all of the Acts and the Treaty are being systematically violated
at Alberta’s tar sands. The panel concluded that the passivity and timidity of the national government were simply unwarranted given the existing legislative and Treaty mandates.28
There are two fundamental conclusions from this case. First, continuing development of the Alberta tar sands, other upstream mineral
resources, and new sources of energy at projected rates of growth
threaten to inflict enormous environmental damage on the Northwest
Territories. If allowed to occur, these damages will not only have devastating effects on aboriginal citizens but also inflict costs in the form of
lost environmental services on a far wider population. In this instance,
the welfare of First Nations citizens as protected by law can be viewed as
consonant with the objectives to protect environmental assets conferring
benefits on a far larger population. These two objectives are joint in nature and can be jointly achieved.
Secondly, institutions (specifically laws and treaties) are already
in place to enforce the policies that will protect the environment and
treat aboriginal peoples fairly. Policy, as if equity matters, simply requires the enforcement of existing laws and treaties by the national government of Canada. It is true that rigorous enforcement of such laws will
retard and constrain the development of the tar sands, but these equity
considerations are likely supported by relevant economic values. What is
required is a policy decision between one option that protects environmental assets and enhances the welfare of aboriginal peoples and another that favors the oil and gas industry, its producers, and its
consumers.
B. CASE STUDY II: The Colorado River—Rationing Over-Allocation
Many western streams are already over-allocated. Over-allocation
now looms in the more humid East as recent experiences in the metro-

26. Id. at 17.
27. 1899 Can. T.S. No. 8.
28. ROSENBERG INTERNATIONAL FORUM
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politan regions of Washington, D.C., and Atlanta, Georgia, attest.29 In
this context, over-allocation is taken to mean the formal allocation of
rights to waters which, taken together total more than the long-term average annual flow of the stream.30 Over-allocation can occur when rights
are unclear or conflict and/or when more water is used than has been
formally allocated. For several reasons the problems of over-allocation
are expected to become more severe in the future.
Allocation of stream waters is usually based on stream flow measurements from an historical period of record.31 Not infrequently, the period of record is short and may encompass a particularly wet or dry
period. In the case of a wet period, allocations turn out to exceed the
flows that prevail over the long term, resulting in over-allocation. There
are two reasons for suspecting why over-allocation may become more
common. First, it is now understood that stream flow varies within long
time frames. This means that the assumption of stream flow stationarity—holding that historical patterns of stream flow are a valid guide to
future patterns—in fact is not a valid assumption. Indeed, evidence from
tree ring records and measurements of streams over long periods of time
confirmed non-stationarity as the only acceptable assumption. This
means that stream flow averages change over long time periods. There
are wet periods and dry periods that last for decades and centuries. The
long-term nominal variation in climate means that in the future some
proportion of the nation’s streams that may not have been over-allocated
in the past will become so in the future.32
The second reason for expecting that stream flow allocation may
become more common is global climate change. Today, there is an
emerging consensus that anthropomorphic activities will likely accelerate and accentuate long-term climate changes.33 In addition, most of the
modeling efforts to date suggest that the mid-latitudes of the United
States are likely to become drier as a result. Changes in the time of
snowmelt and runoff may also diminish the quantities of stream flow
available for use in the warmer months when various water demands
tend to peak.34
29. David L. Feldman, Preventing the Repetition: Or What Los Angeles’ Experience in
Water Management Can Teach Atlanta About Urban Water Disputes, 45 WATER RESOURCES RESEARCH W04422 (2009).
30. Id.
31. P.C.D. Milly et al., Stationarity Is Dead: Whither Water Management? 319 SCIENCE 1,
573–74 (2008).
32. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COLORADO RIVER BASIN WATER MANAGEMENT, EVALUATING AND ADJUSTING TO HYDROCLIMATIC VARIABILITY (2007).
33. P.C.D. Milly et al., supra note 31, at 573–74.
34. Id. at 189.
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Over-allocation should prompt special concern largely because
there is very little experience in dealing with it. In almost every instance
it will require that either right holders reduce their water use below
usual and accustomed levels, or the reduction of quantities attached to
different rights. In either of these cases, real economic losses are likely to
ensue, prompting strong incentives to resist such losses.
The importance of this point can be illustrated by the adjudicational experience of several urban groundwater basins in southern California. There, a number of urban groundwater basins were persistently
over drafted, ultimately causing the realization that current rates of use
could not be sustained.35 In many instances, the state court system was
given the responsibility of adjudicating the claims to pumping rights in
these basins. It was recognized at the outset that many, if not all ground
water extractors would have to reduce the historical level of individual
extractions in order to bring total extractions into balance with rates of
recharge. These reductions were offset by making supplemental surface
supplies available so that total usage remained constant despite the
court-mandated reduction in individual ground water extractions. In
summary, there are no instances in California where persistent overdraft
has resulted in reductions in aggregate use. One source is simply substituted for another. In some circles this is called the “physical solution” to
groundwater overdraft.36
The problem with physical solutions to over-allocated river basins
is that water supplies are either static or shrinking while demands for
them grow. This means that in most locales, supplemental waters to affect physical solutions are not available, thus rendering physical solutions infeasible. Managers of water resources at the river basin level will
soon have to confront circumstances in which water rights or entitlements will have to be reduced absolutely. As a result, these reductions
with their attendant economic losses will have to be imposed in some
fashion regarded as fair.
Consider next, the Colorado River Basin which flows through the
seven southwestern states and into Mexico. It is the longest river in the
world flowing through predominantly arid lands. The southwestern
United States is the fastest growing and urbanizing region of the country. Several major urban areas such as Los Angeles, Phoenix, Las Vegas,
Salt Lake City, and Denver are dependent upon the waters of the Colorado to support existing populations and new growth. Irrigated agriculture, which is the largest consumptive user of water in the basin, is

ERN

35. WILLIAM BLOMQUIST, DIVIDING
CALIFORNIA 52–54 (1992).
36. Id. at 304.
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dependent upon Colorado River flows, although not exclusively. Additionally, the Colorado River flows through some of the most spectacular
environments in the world—rendering many environmental amenities
and services dependent upon its flows.
The story of the division of the waters of the Colorado River is
widely known.37 This case study rests on three primary circumstances
that characterize the Colorado River Basin: First, the waters of the river
have been over-allocated. The existing allocations among nations and
states which have been solemnized by three interstate compacts, an international treaty, and one Supreme Court decision were based upon a
period of record that barely exceeded 50 years. The period in question
turns out to have been much wetter than subsequent periods and much
wetter than what is now thought to be the long-term average flow. In
short, the various formal instruments, all of which have been ratified in
one form or another by the federal government, have allocated quantities
of water among the United States, Mexico, and the seven basin states
that exceed the quantities that now appear to be available. Until now, the
over-allocation has not caused many problems because some of the upper basin states have never used their full allocations. It appears, however, that with continued population growth in the region and
intensifying scarcity of water from all sources, over-allocation will become increasingly urgent and must be addressed.
A second circumstance and source of enormous uncertainty surrounding issues of water rights and entitlements in the basin is the status
of Native American water rights. Under the terms of various decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court, including Winters v. United States, nations,
bands, or tribes of Native Americans who reside on reservations are entitled to such waters as needed to satisfy the purposes for which the reservation was created.38 Additionally, in Arizona v. California, the Court held
that the amount of practicably irrigable acreage can be used as a standard in establishing the quantities of water to which groups of Native
Americans may be entitled.39 Under the terms of these and other decisions and policies related to tribal water rights, the tribes of the Colorado
River Basin are in a position to advance claims that, in the aggregate,
may exceed the entire flow of the Colorado River. Many of these claims
37. NORRIS HUNDLEY, DIVIDING THE WATERS: A CENTURY OF CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE
UNITED STATES AND MEXICO (1966); NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, WATER AND CHOICE IN
THE COLORADO RIVER BASIN: AN EXAMPLE OF ALTERNATIVES IN WATER MANAGEMENT (1968);
WATER AND THE ARID LANDS OF THE WESTERN UNITED STATES (Mohamed El-Ashry & Diana
Gibbons eds., 1988); NORRIS HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO RIVER
COMPACT AND THE POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST (2d ed. 2009).
38. Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908).
39. Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 565 (1963).
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have not been asserted or adjudicated but they would almost certainly
come into play in any process intended to adjust the allocation of basin
waters downward. Moreover, the need to accommodate such claims
would complicate the entire process enormously.
A third and final point has to do with the economics of existing
allocations of water within the basin. When judged on the basis of economic efficiency criteria, the existing allocation can be characterized as
inefficient. No scarcity value is assigned to the water itself. The price
paid by users includes only the costs of capture, treatment, and delivery,
which are frequently even subsidized. Among other things this signals to
users that water is freely available, which it is not. High-valued uses—
such as those to support an urban population in Las Vegas—go begging,
while low valued uses such as growing alfalfa in the desert are lavishly
served. Water for environmental purposes is probably under allocated as
well. It is fair to assert that an allocative system that acknowledges water
scarcity accommodates hydrologic variability by providing means to
equilibrate allocations in different years with available supplies, and one
that reduces perceived inequities would be superior to the system now
in place.
An arrangement proposed here would address and have the potential to resolve all of these problems. The proposal would entail a reduction and rearrangement of allocative entitlements which would yield
a residual pool of water that could be devoted to the highest valued uses
through a market-like exchange. It would have the following elements:
• Ensure the first priority to Colorado River stream flows would
be sufficient to satisfy the U.S. Mexican Treaty of 1944 as
amended.
• Second priority would be accorded to “lifeline quantities” of
water reserved to each of the seven basin states. Such quantities would be modest, perhaps 20 gallons/day/capita.
• Third priority would be assigned to environmental flows
which would be established by the Secretary of the Interior on
the recommendation of an expert committee to be appointed
by the National Academy of Sciences. Environmental allocations would be reviewed and adjusted adaptively each
decade.
• Use rights to the remaining flows would be vested with the
Colorado River Basin tribes, who would be further authorized
to establish a Colorado River Water Exchange through which
the water would be available to the highest bidder.
• The Exchange would permit the sale of water rights, with appropriate priority attached: long-term water leases, short-term
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water leases, a water bank for the banking of water, and a spot
market.
• The economic rent from the sale and lease of this water would
accrue to the tribes.
• The Secretary of the Interior would remain the River Master
and would continue to serve in appropriate trustee roles for
the tribes. This would ensure that there would be appropriate
oversight and regulation of the exchanges.
The resulting Colorado River Water Exchange would have numerous benefits to citizens of the southwestern United States and to the
nation at large. First, by vesting rights to the waters of the region to Native Americans, more than a century of unfair treatment could be rectified. It would give Native Americans a stake in, and the benefits of,
natural resources that may have been taken from them. It would also
acknowledge the historical record of Native Americans as husbanders of
natural resources. It would be a policy that illustrates how equity
matters.
Second, it would provide “lifeline” quantities of water to each of
the seven basin states with a scarcity cost of zero for the purpose of ensuring adequate supplies of both drinking and water sanitation services.
This allotment would be modest—on the order of 20 gallons per person
per day. Using 2008 population estimates for the basin states means that
less than 1.3 million acre-feet would be needed for this purpose.
Third, it would acknowledge and explicitly provide allocations of
appropriate quantities of stream flow to protect and support environmental amenities and environmental services. In addition, it would provide that these allocations could be adjusted adaptively every five years
or so as additional experience and knowledge are gained.
Fourth, market-like arrangements for the allocation of water
among consumptive uses could ensure that water is allocated efficiently.
That is, water would be put to uses maximizing the economic return to
water. Markets would “wring” inefficient, low-valued uses out of the
system and “rationalize” (in economic terms) the patterns of water
allocation.
Fifth, this arrangement would allow for different types of rights
and titles. Thus, for example, for urban areas that need reliable supplies,
there would be the possibility of purchasing rights which have a high
priority. Short and long-term leases could also be accommodated. Spot
markets would allow for onetime acquisition of water for specific
purposes.
Sixth, the exchange would provide an allocative mechanism
which could adjust to inevitable hydrologic variations through year-byyear allocations and over the longer run. The water bank envisioned as
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one element in the water exchange would also provide a means of evening out water flows in the river.
Finally, the federal interests in the Colorado River would be protected, providing firm guarantees of sufficient water to honor U.S. treaty
obligations to Mexico. The federal role would remain limited as supervisory and of broad oversight.
In spite of the various advantages offered by this proposal, there
is every reason to expect resistance to individual parts as well as in its
totality from many of the existing water using interests in the basin. This
would be almost inevitable given the fundamental changes in allocations
and the distribution of “rights” that are implicit in the proposal. Nevertheless, there are broad opportunities for strong coalitions to develop
support for the arrangements outlined above. For example, two states
where existing water supplies are probably inadequate to meet current
and prospective demands—Nevada and California—might well join
with Colorado Basin tribes in an effort to move an agenda forward to
accomplish the kinds of changes proposed herein.
What seems clear is that simply resisting change will not work for
very much longer. More water has been allocated than will likely be present in the river on an average annual basis, and the prospects for developing additional storage are not at all encouraging. Moreover, the
opportunities to develop new supplies through recycling and desalination are, for the most part, very costly. A Colorado River Water Exchange is likely to make water available at less cost, address longstanding inequities, and provide appropriate guarantees for international and environmental commitments. Nevertheless, the arrangements
proposed herein will be resisted by those with large stakes in the status
quo; despite the fact that the pervasive scarcity of water in the basin will
likely make the status quo untenable. These proposed arrangements will
benefit citizens throughout the basin by ensuring that water is put to its
most productive uses while at the same time conferring significant benefits on the basin’s indigenous citizens. No alternative arrangements
which would achieve most or all of these outcomes have been proposed.
It is not clear whether there is any alternative arrangement that would
benefit the citizens of the Colorado River Basin to the same or greater
extent than those proposed in this article.
IV. CONCLUSION
Considerations of equity have not been prominent in the making
of water resources policy in the United States and elsewhere. The explanations are numerous and include the difficulty of tracking the incidence
of the costs and benefits of water policy, the inability of economists to
make prescriptive recommendations regarding equity, and the frequent
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desire of policymakers to ignore or mask the distributional consequences
of policies related to natural resources. Recent history shows that it
would be unusual—and sometimes confounding—to base water policies
solely on distributional or equity considerations. There are, nevertheless,
numerous opportunities in which substantive management objectives
can be combined with equity goals to achieve joint outcomes. The two
case studies described in this article are examples.
Northern Voices entails issues of fairness to the indigenous peoples
who inhabit the Mackenzie Basin of northern Canada. There are numerous laws and at least one treaty that appear to protect various elements
of environmental quality which are important both spiritually and economically to these peoples. What is missing is political will on the part of
the Canadian national government to enforce existing laws and treaties
that protect the environmental assets of the Mackenzie Basin. The equity
implications of this failure extend beyond the Northwest Territories and
Canada to inhabitants of the northern and central Americas and perhaps
to all of the inhabitants of the Western Hemisphere who depend upon
the environmental attributes of the Mackenzie Basin to maintain environmental quality generally. The fact that indigenous peoples of the basin are prepared to act as stewards of these resources would confer large
and widespread benefits upon the millions who inhabit the Western
Hemisphere. Effective implementation of policy as if equity matters is
just as important as the policy itself.
The Colorado River is characterized by over-allocation of its waters. Climatic variability and change threaten to reduce river runoff further, and exacerbate the over-allocation. Native peoples of the basin have
not benefited fully from the presence of water and other resources,
though the basin is their homeland. The establishment of a Colorado
River Water Exchange would: (1) guarantee water to meet treaty obligations with Mexico, for environmental purposes and to provide minimal
quantities for basic human domestic and sanitary needs, and (2) provide
for auction of the remainder to the highest bidder with profits and rents
to be retained by Colorado Basin tribes. Such an exchange would provide an effective means of rationing increasingly scarce water supplies in
the basin and compensate for some of the inequities that have been visited upon the native peoples of the basin historically. The establishment
of such an exchange would be an example of a policy in which equity
matters.

